Behind Pahalgam’s Bloodshed: Tracing China’s Elusive Shadow-OxBig News Network

The Pahalgam attack on April 22, 2025, which killed 26 people, mostly tourists, in Jammu and Kashmir’s Baisaran Valley, has left India in shock and mourning. The Resistance Front (TRF), a militant group tied to Pakistan’s Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), claimed responsibility for this brutal act, though they later retracted it. As India accuses Pakistan of fueling terrorism, a term has surfaced in discussions – the “Chinese shadow.” This phrase hints at possible Chinese involvement, not just in diplomacy but also in the technology used by the attackers. Reports of a Chinese satellite phone, encrypted messaging apps, and even whispers of PL-15 missile deliveries add layers to this complex issue. So, what does this “shadow” really mean? Let’s explore 

The attack was horrific. Five armed militants, carrying M4 carbines and AK-47s, stormed the serene Baisaran Valley, a tourist spot accessible only by foot or horseback. They segregated victims by religion, targeting Hindus, and left 26 dead, including 25 Indians and one Nepali. India has blamed Pakistan, with Prime Minister Narendra Modi vowing to punish the culprits. Pakistan denies involvement and has called for an international probe, supported by its ally, China. This diplomatic backing is where the “Chinese shadow” begins.

China’s role, on the surface, is limited to words. On April 27, 2025, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi spoke to Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar, calling for an “impartial probe” and urging both nations to avoid escalation. China condemned the attack, with spokesperson Guo Jiakun saying it opposes all forms of terrorism. But this support for Pakistan, a close ally through projects like the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), raises suspicions in India. By backing Pakistan’s call for an investigation, is China merely playing a neutral diplomat or subtly challenging India’s narrative? This is the first layer of the shadow.

However, the shadow grows darker with reports of Chinese technology in the attack. The National Investigation Agency (NIA) has found evidence that the terrorists used a Huawei satellite phone, possibly smuggled from Pakistan, to communicate with their handlers. These phones, banned in India since the 2020 Galwan clashes, were detected in the Baisaran Valley on the day of the attack. The terrorists also used Chinese messaging apps with advanced encryption, making it hard for Indian agencies to track their plans. These apps, also banned in India, use features like end-to-end encryption, steganography (hiding messages in images or videos), and frequency hopping to evade surveillance. Intelligence sources say such technology is popular among terror groups because it’s tough to crack.

This raises uncomfortable questions. How did banned Chinese devices reach the terrorists? Were they smuggled across the Line of Control (LoC) from Pakistan, as some reports suggest? The use of Huawei satellite phones and encrypted apps points to a sophisticated operation, possibly with logistical support from Pakistan-based handlers. While there’s no direct evidence linking Chinese companies or the government to the attack, the presence of this technology complicates India’s security challenges. It’s not the first time Chinese devices have been linked to terrorism – similar reports have surfaced in past attacks, fueling concerns about whether Chinese firms are indirectly aiding terror groups.

Then there’s the mention of PL-15 deliveries, which adds another dimension. The PL-15 is a Chinese-made, long-range air-to-air missile used by the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF). Recent reports indicate China has been supplying these missiles to Pakistan, with deliveries noted in military cooperation agreements. While there’s no evidence connecting PL-15s directly to the Pahalgam attack, their mention in this context suggests broader worries about China’s military support to Pakistan. The PL-15, with its advanced radar and range, strengthens Pakistan’s air force, potentially emboldening its strategic posture against India. For some, this military aid casts a “shadow” over regional security, indirectly empowering Pakistan’s actions, even if not tied to the attack itself.

So, what does all this indicate? The “Chinese shadow” in the Pahalgam attack seems to have three parts. First, there’s China’s diplomatic support for Pakistan, which feels like a thorn to India. Second, the use of Chinese satellite phones and encrypted apps by the terrorists points to a troubling reliance on banned technology, possibly smuggled through Pakistan. Third, the broader context of China’s military supplies, like PL-15 missiles, fuels fears of an emboldened Pakistan. Yet, there’s no concrete proof that China directly orchestrated or supported the attack. The evidence points to TRF and its Pakistan-based LeT connections, with Chinese technology playing a supporting, not starring, role.

As Indians, we’re right to feel uneasy. China’s close ties with Pakistan, its diplomatic moves, and the presence of its technology in a deadly attack stir distrust. But we must stick to facts. The Pahalgam attack was carried out by militants, and the trail leads to Pakistan, not Beijing. The Huawei phone and apps suggest logistical gaps that India must plug, perhaps by tightening border security and cracking down on smuggling. The PL-15 deliveries, while concerning, are part of a larger geopolitical game, not a direct link to terrorism.

The focus now should be justice for the 26 lives lost and safety for our people. The NIA is probing the attack, and India has taken strong steps, like suspending the Indus Waters Treaty. While we keep an eye on China’s “shadow” – its diplomacy, devices, and defence deals – let’s not lose sight of the real enemy: terrorism. No shadow, Chinese or otherwise, should distract us from ensuring such tragedies never happen again.

(Girish Linganna is a Defence and Aerospace Analyst based out of Bengaluru. He is also the Director of ADD Engineering Components, India, Pvt. Ltd, a subsidiary of ADD Engineering GmbH, Germany. The views expressed in this article are of the author only.)