UK Military Rhetoric Doesn’t Match Fiscal Reality | Company Business News

(Bloomberg Opinion) — Not long before World War I, HMS Dreadnought, a battleship that made all existing vessels obsolete, was launched at Portsmouth in the presence of the King-Emperor Edward VII. Fire-breathing patriots soon took up the cry, “We want eight and we won’t wait.” Winston Churchill, then a young home secretary in a government committed to spending more on welfare, wryly noted of the popular clamor for a naval race with Germany: “The Admiralty had demanded six ships; the economists offered four; and we finally compromised on eight.”

British debates about defense spending follow a familiar trajectory, although this time it’s politicians, rather than civilians, insisting that more should be spent on firepower. A military revolution in warfare is underway, too. Drones, off-the-shelf technology far cheaper than Dreadnoughts, are being deployed to lethal effect on the battlefields of Ukraine and further afield – the daring ‘Spider Web’ raid last weekend destroyed as much as a third of Russia’s strategic bombing force based thousands of miles away from Europe. 

But the UK needs to replace expensive military hardware too, and make good shortages of munitions. Economists fear the government can’t afford the outlay without large tax increases. Who will prevail?

In a speech prior to the publication of his government’s Strategic Defence Review (SDR) this week, Prime Minister Keir Starmer sounded eerily reminiscent of an old-fashioned jingoist, circa 1914. Britain, he said, faces a threat “more serious, more immediate and more unpredictable than at any time since the Cold War.” The UK needs to move to “war-fighting readiness.”

Alas, reality and rhetoric don’t match. UK defense spending is planned to rise to only 2.5% of gross domestic product by 2027, with a notional ambition to reach 3% by the mid-2030s. In the 1980s, at the end of the Cold War, it stood at almost 4%. When the dogged Defence Secretary John Healey attempted to impose a fixed timeline for a bigger military budget, he was immediately slapped down by the Treasury.

Within days, however, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization trumped Starmer. The Western Alliance has reached near consensus on a 5% commitment, with 3.5% going directly on the armed services and a further 1.5% on related spending. On Thursday, US Secretary of Defense Peter Hegseth, ordered Starmer to saddle up, saying “it is important that the UK gets there.” On Tuesday, German Defense Secretary Boris Pistorius talked of raising expenditure by annual increments to reach 5% of GDP, aimed at creating the strongest conventional army in Europe.

At home, the popular hue and cry is not for an arms race with Russia, which remains a niche preoccupation at Westminster and in security circles, but for reversing cuts to pensioners’ winter-fuel allowances. Labour’s backbenchers oppose projected welfare reductions. Meanwhile, the economists warn that the bond market won’t countenance more borrowing to pay for guns or butter – gilt yields remain elevated amid jitters over the Trump administration’s ballooning deficit. Chancellor of the Exchequer Rachel Reeves rules out raising taxes in the autumn —  though few believe her. Something’s got to give.

UK prime ministers have a habit of over-promising and under-delivering on military commitments. Starmer’s Conservative predecessors squandered the Cold War peace dividend for over a decade even as Russia rearmed and attacked its neighbors.

Wishful thinking can also lead to embarrassment. Starmer recently proclaimed “a coalition of the willing” ready to take the place of the US in policing a ceasefire in Ukraine by dispatching a “reassurance force.” Washington, however, refused to offer air cover — and in any case the British army has shrunk to 70,000, levels last seen before the war with Napoleon — so the UK can no longer assemble an expeditionary force. The best it can offer Ukraine is a support mission. 

As for crippling the Russian war effort, the UK, like other European nations, sanctioned Russian oil and gas after its invasion of Ukraine. But according to a new study by the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA), the value of Russian crude oil and liquid natural gas shipped under British ownership or insurance since the war began tops £200 billion ($270 billion). A dark fleet of ships working for the Russians supplements the trade. The government is wary of severing these links for fear of triggering another energy price rise spiral and a round of the ruinous inflation and cost of living crisis that sank its Tory predecessor. 

To be fair, the SDR has met a mostly warm reception from military specialists. At least it puts the focus back on the European theater — previous reviews suggested fanciful scenarios in which British aircraft carriers, without a full complement of aircraft and naval escorts, might be deployed to Asia. With commendable honesty, the authors of this week’s report also own up to “the hollowing out of the Armed Forces warfighting capability” and cite inadequate stockpiles of munitions after years of “underinvestment.” 

Without a rapid improvement in military housing and in the absence of conscription, army numbers are unlikely to rise. With its suggestion that the UK should build up its maritime forces — namely the Trident nuclear deterrent and the commissioning of 12 new attack submarines — the SDR implies the UK is set on going back to a strategic stance familiar to Churchill and his contemporaries in 1914, known to historians as the British Way of Warfare, avoiding a continental military commitment at scale.  

Today, however, the Royal Navy no longer rules the waves as it did in 1914. That means cutting back on the rhetoric and working closely with allies to deploy the few troops available for land-based conflict.  “This is a once-in-a-generation inflection point for collective security in Europe,” concludes the SDR. Unless British public opinion changes, however, the UK’s neglect of its military needs and obligations looks set to continue.

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This column reflects the personal views of the author and does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.

Martin Ivens is the editor of the Times Literary Supplement. Previously, he was editor of the Sunday Times of London and its chief political commentator.

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